

The prevention of price-based exclusionary conduct in the context of merger control A comparative analysis of the European, German and French perspective

Markus Welzenbach

Summary

The preservation of an effective competition is based on different pillars, both preventive and repressive. The sanctioning of price-based exclusionary conduct such as margin squeezes falls within the scope of the *ex-post* control of anti-competitive practices. However, such *ex-post* control is only partially suitable for preventing a dominant undertaking from squeezing out its competitors. For this reason, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether merger control provides for the necessary tools to prevent the emergence of such abusive behaviour in the future.

In the first part of this thesis, the issue of identifying possible price-based exclusionary conduct during merger control proceedings is addressed. The thesis focuses particularly on the problem of how to proof such future strategies. On the basis of a critical evaluation of the different